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Preface 
 
This paper arises from a meeting convened by the LSE in February 2010 to consider the 
implications of developments in climate policy in late 2009.   
 
The Hartwell meeting was a private meeting, held under the Chatham House Rule. It 
included participants from various disciplines in the sciences and humanities, from 
academic and other walks of life and from around the world. The resulting Hartwell Paper 
is the third in a series to have been co-published in a collaboration between London and 
Oxford. In 2007, Professor Steve Rayner and I published The Wrong Trousers: Radically 
Rethinking Climate Policy, and an associated summary of some of the main arguments in 
Nature (‘Time to ditch Kyoto’, 449, 25 October). This was followed in July 2009, with a 
larger circle of co-authorship, by ‘How to get climate policy back on course’. That circle 
has changed and expanded further for the present work.  
 
The Mackinder Programme at the LSE exists to delve into the deeper driving forces of 
events, which may, like a volcano, produce sudden eruptions but which are different from 
and more than the accumulated visible clouds of smoke and ash. It is concerned with the 
magma and the tectonic plates – the geopolitics, including especially the many cultural 
dimensions – of events. Accordingly, the purpose of the Hartwell meeting was to take a 
long view of all the aspects of the crisis which enveloped global climate policy during the 
winter of 2009/10.  Many of us were not surprised that climate diplomacy had crashed: we 
had been predicting this for some time. Other aspects were less expected. Therefore, in 
early February 2010 we sought to discover to what degree we shared an understanding of 
what had gone on and why; but especially, we sought in discussion and concretely in this 
paper, to look forward and to recommend productive courses of action.  
 
The School is grateful for financial support from the Japan Iron and Steel Federation and 
the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, the Nathan Cummings Foundation 
(NCF), New York and the Fondation Hoffmann, Geneva which made this meeting and 
project possible. We have a special debt to Peter Teague, Program Director at NCF, for his 
advice and help. None of the funders necessarily endorses any or all of the resulting 
paper, of course. As convenor, I am grateful to colleagues in the Research Project & 
Development Division and in the Office of Development & Alumni Relations at LSE who 
nimbly and efficiently helped to put together and to manage the support for this work.  
 
I am also extremely grateful to my colleague Johanna Möhring, Visiting Fellow in the 
Mackinder Programme, and to Dalibor Rohac, Weidenfeld Scholar at the University of 
Oxford, for assisting me in the conduct of the Hartwell meeting.  Michael Denton and the 
staff at Hartwell House deserve our thanks for providing us with peaceful surroundings in 
which to meet and for ensuring that the conference-calling all worked faultlessly to 
enable us to include in the discussions Indian and Chinese colleagues who were not able 
to be present in person. Finally, I wish to express my thanks to all co-authors for their 
collegial and intensive engagement.  
 
G. Prins 
London School of Economics  
London 
April 2010 
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Executive Summary 
Climate policy, as it has been understood and practised by many governments of the 
world under the Kyoto Protocol approach, has failed to produce any discernable real 
world reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases in fifteen years. The underlying 
reason for this is that the UNFCCC/Kyoto model was structurally flawed and doomed 
to fail because it systematically misunderstood the nature of climate change as a policy 
issue between 1985 and 2009.  However, the currently dominant approach has acquired 
immense political momentum because of the quantities of political capital sunk into it. 
But in any case the UNFCCC/Kyoto model of climate policy cannot continue because it 
crashed in late 2009. The Hartwell Paper sets and reviews this context; but doing so is 
not its sole or primary purpose.  
 
The crash of 2009 presents an immense opportunity to set climate policy free to fly at 
last.  The principal motivation and purpose of this Paper is to explain and to advance 
this opportunity. To do so involves understanding and accepting a startling 
proposition. It is now plain that it is not possible to have a ‘climate policy’ that has 
emissions reductions as the all encompassing goal. However, there are many other 
reasons why the decarbonisation of the global economy is highly desirable. Therefore, 
the Paper advocates a radical reframing – an inverting – of approach: accepting that 
decarbonisation will only be achieved successfully as a benefit contingent upon other 
goals which are politically attractive and relentlessly pragmatic.   
 
The Paper therefore proposes that the organising principle of our effort should be the 
raising up of human dignity via three overarching objectives: ensuring energy access for 
all; ensuring that we develop in a manner that does not undermine the essential 
functioning of the Earth system; ensuring that our societies are adequately equipped to 
withstand the risks and dangers that come from all the vagaries of climate, whatever 
their cause may be.  
 
It explains radical and practical ways to reduce non-CO2 human forcing of climate.  It 
argues that improved climate risk management is a valid policy goal, and is not simply 
congruent with carbon policy. It explains the political prerequisite of energy efficiency 
strategies as a first step and documents how this can achieve real emissions reductions. 
But, above all, it emphasises the primacy of accelerating decarbonisation of energy 
supply.  This calls for very substantially increased investment in innovation in non-
carbon energy sources in order to diversify energy supply technologies. The ultimate 
goal of doing this is to develop non-carbon energy supplies at unsubsidised costs less 
than those using fossil fuels. The Hartwell Paper advocates funding this work by low 
hypothecated (dedicated) carbon taxes. It opens discussion on how to channel such 
money productively.   
 
To reframe the climate issue around matters of human dignity is not just noble or 
necessary. It is also likely to be more effective than the approach of framing around 
human sinfulness –which has failed and will continue to fail. 
 
The Hartwell Paper follows the advice that a good crisis should not be wasted 
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 Part I: From ‘How to get climate policy back on course’ 
 to ‘The Hartwell paper’ 
 
One year ago, few would have guessed that by the spring of 2010 climate 
policy would be in such public disarray. Two watersheds were crossed during 
the last months of 2009, one political and one scientific. The narratives and 
assumptions upon which major Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) governments had relied until that moment in shaping 
and pushing international climate policy towards becoming global climate 
policy have been undermined.   The course that climate policy has been 
pursuing for more than a decade is no longer sustainable – climate policy 
must find a new way forward. And that presents us with an immense 
opportunity to set climate policy free to fly at last.  The principal motivation 
and purpose of this paper is to explain and to advance this opportunity. 
The first watershed is to be found within intergovernmental and international 
diplomacy. It was crossed on 18th December, a day which marked the 
confusing and disjointed ending to the climate conference in Copenhagen.  
The Accord which emerged from that meeting holds an uncertain status and 
it is not clear what the commitments under it might signify.  Not only had no 
agreements of any consequence been reached, but the very process of 
multilateral diplomacy through large set-piece conferences had been called 
into question. So too was the leading role in global climate policy previously 
assumed by Europe. China, India, Brazil and South Africa in particular took 
initiative and expressed different views from those of the previous ruling 
consensus.1   Yvo de Boer, the long-serving chairman of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), who had guided the 
process through meeting after increasingly inconclusive meeting in recent 
years, has since announced his resignation and future plans to work in the 
private sector. 
The second watershed is to be found within the science of climate change. It 
was crossed on 17th November. The climate science community has 
experienced an accelerated erosion of public trust following the posting on 
that date of more than a 1,000 emails from the University of East Anglia 
Climatic Research Unit.2 These emails, whose authenticity is not denied, 
suggested that scientists may have been acting outside publicly understood 
norms of science in their efforts to bolster their own views and to discredit 
the views of those with whom they disagreed.3  Not long after this, and partly 
as a consequence of the questions of trust thus raised, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which many governments had represented 
to their subjects or citizens as an impeccable “Gold Standard” validating their 
policies, also came under increased (and continuing) scrutiny as a 
consequence of errors and sloppiness, many of longer standing, but 
highlighted specifically in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report.  Universities, 
governments and the United Nations are all now conducting inquiries into 
many aspects of climate science and the conduct of climate scientists and 
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science bureaucrats.  In short, the legitimacy of the institutions of climate 
policy and science are no longer assured.  
In fairness it must be said that the task at Copenhagen was intractable 
because in the years since the promulgation of the “Kyoto Protocol” in 1997 so 
many issues troubling the world have been woven into the tangled knot called 
‘climate change politics’: the loss of biodiversity, the gross inequity in patterns 
of development, degradation of tropical forests, trade restrictions, violation of 
the rights of indigenous peoples, intellectual property rights.  The list seemed 
to grow by the month.  Copenhagen has shown us the limits of what can be 
achieved on climate change through centralising and hyperbolic 
multilateralism.  Climate change – least of all the version of climate change 
we have chosen to construct – cannot be addressed through any single, 
governing, coherent and enforceable thing called ‘climate policy’.4  
 
In July 2009, a group of scholars from institutions in Asia, Europe and North 
America, including a number of the present co-authors, collaborated on a 
paper entitled ‘How to get climate policy back on course’. It explained why 
the “Kyoto” approach, in development since the Rio “Earth Summit” of 1992, 
had failed and was doomed to fail. It recommended an alternative approach 
centred on direct steps to accelerate decarbonisation of the global economy.5  
The July paper also hinted at a much deeper fatal flaw in the dominant 
framing for climate policy: 
 
The … problem is epistemological. It is a 
characteristic of open systems of high complexity and 
with many ill-understood feed-back effects, such as 
the global climate classically is, that there are no self-
declaring indicators which tell the policy maker 
when enough knowledge has been accumulated to 
make it sensible to move into action. Nor, it might be 
argued, can a policy-maker ever possess the type of 
knowledge – distributed, fragmented, private; and 
certainly not in sufficient coherence or quantity – to 
make accurate ‘top down’ directions.  Hence, the 
frequency of failure and of unintended 
consequences.6 
 
 
Without a fundamental re-framing of the issue, new mandates will not be 
granted for any fresh courses of action, even good ones. So, to rebuild climate 
policy and to restore trust in expert organisations, the framing must change 
and change radically.  
 
The authors of this paper are an eclectic group of academics, analysts and 
energy policy advocates without any common political or professional 
affiliation. We are citizens from a small number of OECD countries – UK, 
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USA, Germany, Japan, Finland, Canada – each of us working through 
heterogeneous sets of scholarly, scientific, academic, industrial and policy 
networks. We share a common concern that the current framing of climate 
change and climate policy has ‘boxed us in’. The previous “Kyoto” model has 
dangerously narrowed our option space for thinking seriously and realistically 
about energy and environmental policies. We wish to contribute to a new 
pragmatism in the policy discourse surrounding climate change. To this end, 
we gathered at Hartwell House in Buckinghamshire in February 2010 and this 
paper is the fruit of our work.7  
 
We begin by observing what was once controversial but which now seems 
inescapable: for progress to occur on climate policy, we must reframe the 
issue in a fundamental way: not simply in various procedural details. We must 
describe a different comprehensive approach for climate policy. To that end 
this paper proceeds as follows:  
 
In Part II(A), we first re-focus and state our goals. Then in II(B) we sketch the 
way in which the ‘climate politics’ issue has been framed in the period 1985-
2009. Starting narrowly from hypotheses about global warming and climate 
change as presented to policy makers in the 1980s, the politics of these issues 
grew luxuriantly and began to do very different sorts of work – for 
economists, for theologians, for activists and for politicians of different 
stripes, arrayed on every side of the issue.8 Part II(C) explains why it is in vain 
to hope that science will be capable of telling us what to do.  Instead, we offer 
a modest and practical way to think about science in relation to Earth 
systems. We seek to anchor our policy proposals with the three dimensions of 
this radical re-framing.  
 
Part III, the final part of the paper, updates and details what we believe to be 
essential policy drivers to go forward from 2010. We recognise the immense 
complexity of the systems under examination. Indeed, we explain the special 
nature of that complexity in Part II(C). Our strategy and our proposed 
sequence of actions are shaped principally by that understanding of 
complexity. Therefore, the practical recommended actions in Part III move 
from the relatively most immediate and easily productive to the more 
complicated and long term. In this paper, we discuss but do not dwell on the 
issue of adaptation.  
 
To date, climate policy has focused on carbon dioxide primarily, and even to 
the exclusion of other human influences on the climate system.  We believe 
this path to have been unwise, even if in retrospect the approach was 
understandable, for reasons of gaining political traction.9  We think that there 
is encouraging evidence to suggest that early action on a wider range of 
human influences on climate could be more swiftly productive. We review 
that evidence and make that case in Part III(A). In Part III(B), first we review 
the case for energy efficiency as a means to accelerate decarbonisation of the 
global economy. Energy efficiency is well worth doing for many reasons, but it 
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has mainly short-term benefits for emissions reduction, and its potential is 
limited in the face of the current global growth rate. But efficiency gains give 
political traction by creating a sense both of benefits and of progress; and 
without traction, we are left as we are now, simply spinning our wheels. So 
that is why it comes next. Through a case study of the best documented 
example, we illustrate what best practice can achieve. The third step with 
respect to the accelerated decarbonisation of the global economy is the most 
indispensible but also the most arduous. We therefore present in the second 
part of Part III(B) what we called in our previous paper the “Kaya Direct” 
approach to accelerated decarbonisation.  In so doing, we do not propose a 
grand and comprehensive governance regime to replace the failed regime.  
We are aware that in a complex world, the solutions we propose are not 
practically perfect but rather clumsy: that is our intent and we build this 
awareness into our approach.10  
 
Finally, there is the question of money. Our proposals in Part III (C) for 
innovation to achieve accelerated decarbonisation require additional funding 
from somewhere, by someone. We agree with others that the huge efforts 
that have been invested in elaborating complex top-down regulatory regimes, 
and in particular the ambitions for regional – let alone global – “Cap & Trade” 
regimes to regulate carbon by price, can be now seen to have been barren in 
their stated aims although profitable for some in unexpected and unwelcome 
ways.11 
 
If one seeks long-lasting impact, the best line of approach may not be head-
on. “Lose the object and draw nigh obliquely” is a dictum attributed to the 
famous eighteenth century English landscape gardener Lancelot “Capability” 
Brown.12  Brown’s designs framed the stately home at the entrance, but only 
briefly. After allowing the visitor a glimpse of his destination, the driveway 
would veer away to pass circuitously and delightfully through woodland 
vistas, through broad meadows with carefully staged aperçus of waterfalls and 
temples, across imposing bridges spanning dammed streams and lakes, before 
delivering the visitor in a relaxed and amused frame of mind, unexpectedly, 
right in front of the house.  That displays a subtle skill which has manifest 
political value: the capacity to deliver an ambitious objective harmoniously.  
“Capability” Brown might be a useful tutor for designers of climate policies.13  
His advice would be to approach the object of emissions reduction via other 
goals, riding with other constituencies and gathering other benefits.  
 
Throughout this paper we are critical of the way in which the carbon issue has 
been overloaded with the baggage of other framings and agendas.  The oblique 
approach which we advocate may appear at first glance to be no different because 
it adopts multiple framings and agendas as well.  But that would be a mistake.  
Currently, all the framings and agendas are mobilised to advance the one core 
goal of decarbonising the energy system via the UNFCCC/Kyoto process.  Our 
approach is actually the opposite:  multiple framings and agendas are pursued in 
their own right, and according to their own logics and along their own appropriate 
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paths.  Decarbonisation is a contingent benefit, not an encompassing one. This is 
a radical difference: indeed, an inversion. 
 
In our opinion, the experience of the recent failure of the frontal assault on 
climate policy – the implausibly straight driveway from the present to a 
magically decarbonised future – suggests that a more indirect yet 
encompassing approach via the attainment of different objectives which bring 
contingent benefits is, indeed, the only one that is likely to be materially (in 
contrast to rhetorically) successful. As ‘How to get climate policy back on 
course’ already documented, despite being the dominant policy for many 
years, there is no evidence that, despite vast investment of time, effort and 
money, the “Kyoto” type approach has produced  any discernable acceleration 
of decarbonisation whatsoever: not anywhere; not in any region.14 
 
Therefore, in our view, the organising principle of our effort should be the 
raising up of human dignity and in that pursuit, our re-framed primary goals 
should be three: 
 
1) to ensure that the basic needs, especially the energy demands, of the 
world’s growing population are adequately met. ‘Adequacy’ means energy that 
is simultaneously accessible, secure and low-cost. 
 
2) to ensure that we develop  in a manner that does not undermine the 
essential functioning  of the Earth system, in recent years most commonly 
reflected in concerns about accumulating carbon dioxide (CO2) in the 
atmosphere, but certainly not limited to that factor alone;  
 
3) to ensure that our societies are adequately equipped to withstand the risks 
and dangers that come from all the vagaries of climate, whatever may be their 
cause. 
 
These primary goals are articulated with the goal of emissions reduction via 
“Capability” Brown’s dictum. 
 
 
 Part II: Radical Re-framing 
 
On hearing of the death of the hitherto indestructible French diplomat 
Talleyrand, who had managed to switch allegiance successfully from 
Napoleon to the Bourbon restoration, Count Metternich of Austria is reputed 
to have asked suspiciously, “I wonder what he meant by that?”   
 
Apocryphal or not, the anecdote simply applies the correct question to ask of 
any diplomatic action. It is correct because it forces us to check for any 
hidden agenda or, in the language of social theory, to check for and to 
identify the framing of a statement or policy. The more highly charged the 
issue, the more likely that there will be multiple framings, or multiple 
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agendas hiding behind one framing. In the case of climate change, one of the 
co-authors in this paper first made this essential point more than a decade 
ago and Mike Hulme has most recently provided an extended discussion of its 
multiple framings.15   
 
What might an alternative strategic approach to meeting these three primary 
goals look like in practice? It should be politically attractive, meaning an 
approach which allows us to take a few small steps which offer rapid and 
demonstrable pay-back, thus helping to sustain the effort.  It should be 
politically inclusive, meaning an approach which is pluralist in instinct. And it 
should be relentlessly pragmatic, meaning an approach which prizes progress 
that can be measured in the short as well as long terms.  In stating these goals 
we assume a radically different framing of what the idea of anthropogenic 
climate change means for an early twenty-first century world and what that, 
in turn, means for practical politics.   
 
The first step is to recognise that energy policy and climate policy are not the 
same thing. Although they are intimately related, neither can satisfactorily be 
reduced to the other. Energy policy should focus on securing reliable and 
sustainable low-cost supply, and, as a matter of human dignity, attend 
directly to the development demands from the world’s poorest people, 
especially their present lack of clean, reliable and affordable energy.  One 
important reason that more than 1.5 billion people presently lack access to 
electricity is that energy simply costs too much. Obviously, if energy were 
free, then its provision would be simple. Even if such access could be supplied 
from fossil fuels – which is plausible but also debatable – this demand for 
access to energy, for reasons of cost and security should not be satisfied by 
locking in long-term dependence on fossil fuels.16 
 
Providing the world with massive amounts of new energy supply to meet 
expected growth in demand, while simultaneously vigorously increasing 
access to energy for people currently without it, will therefore require 
diversification of supply. Diversification beyond fossil fuels necessarily implies 
an accelerated pace of decarbonisation. Such diversification ought to be a 
leading incentive to decarbonise future energy supplies.  
 
We then need to separate the policy frameworks and interventions for 
attending to short-lived versus long-lived climate forcing agents. There is no 
obvious logical reason, for example, for connecting policies for reducing 
emissions of methane with those for reducing the emissions of halocarbons.  
The physical properties, sources and policy levers of short-lived forcing agents 
– black soot, aerosols, methane and tropospheric ozone – are quite different 
from those of long-lived forcing agents – carbon dioxide, halocarbons, nitrous 
oxide. In Part III below, where we set out our policy priorities, we argue that 
early action on non-CO2 forcing agents should be part of a radically different 
and radically realistic response to our goals.    
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And thirdly, with the failure of the UNFCCC process to fulfil the function, we 
need to stimulate new thinking for enabling societies better to manage 
climate risks. All societies are ill-adapted to climate to some degree.  In other 
words, climate extremes and variability imposes costs on all societies (as well, 
of course, as generating benefits). It is, therefore, important to evolve 
technologies, institutions and management practices which address the 
avoidable costs and damages wrought by climate, even more so to build this 
adaptive capacity whilst climate and society – and consequential risks – both 
change.  These initiatives and the sharing of good adaptation practice make 
sense irrespective of views on the degree to which climate risks are being 
changed by human activities or how quickly they are changing.  Adaptation 
policies should be untethered from those focused on decarbonisation. 
 
These three strategic goals need not – indeed must not – be stitched together 
into one single impossible policy package, where connections between ends 
and means become inextricably intertwined. When connections between 
ends and means become obscured, policy discussions are too easily hijacked 
by diversionary disputes, such as the argument about whether or not the 
science behind preventing a two degree global temperature target – or indeed 
any comparable global target – is sound. Similarly, the degeneration of debate 
at Copenhagen from windy rhetoric about planetary emergency into hard 
anger from many NGOs and ‘global southern’ states was revealing.  When the 
large, rich states refused to agree to the cash transfers that were being 
demanded, it displayed how different interests and agendas were concealed 
within utopian talk of global and universal solutions. 
 
 A: Our three over-arching goals   
 1) Ensuring energy access for all  
 
In his forthcoming book, The Climate Fix, Roger Pielke Jr argues that a 
commitment to fulfilling all three of the objectives of energy access, security 
of supply and lower cost together, implies necessarily a requirement to 
diversify energy supply beyond fossil fuels. Diversification in turn necessarily 
means accelerated decarbonisation. Prospects for diversification will be 
greatly enhanced if alternatives to fossil fuels at lowere costs can be 
developed. Google has advocated this in its RE<C (‘renewable energy at a cost 
less than coal’) initiative and Bill Gates has also recently called for major 
investment in R&D to make low-carbon power, including nuclear power, 
cheaper than coal.17 Achieving such a goal will necessarily involve a level of 
effort, in both time and money, comparable to that which nations typically 
invest to ensure public health or protect national security.  
 
The need for energy supply diversification is perhaps best understood in 
terms of ensuring energy access.  Present estimates suggest that about 1.5 
billion worldwide people lack access to electricity. Many scenarios for the 
‘successful’ implementation of mitigation policies leave what we believe to be 
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an unacceptable number of people literally in the dark.  For instance, the 
International Energy Authority’s (IEA) 2009 450 Scenario to 2030 has global 
emissions on a trajectory to stabilisation at 450 ppm carbon dioxide; yet 1.3 
billion people worldwide remain without access to electricity. For energy-
poor countries with large populations, such scenarios inescapably paint a 
picture of rich countries who value limiting emissions over economic 
development elsewhere in the world.  India, for example, has long made it 
plain that it will not find attractive any climate-related strategy which does 
not grapple with fundamental issues of inequity.18 We believe that leaving 
more than a billion people without access to electricity by 2030 would 
represent policy failure. If energy access is to be expanded to include a 
majority of those without access today, while meeting expected growth in 
global energy demand in the rest of the world, the costs of energy will 
necessarily have to come down. The higher quality fossil fuels are in already 
tight markets. If the attempt is made to satisfy this new demand from these 
initially, as would be probable, the opposite is more likely to occur. Costs 
would rise. Alternatives to fossil fuels will therefore have to become cheaper.  
For this to happen, innovation is required.19  
 
 2) Ensuring viable environments protected from various forcings  
  
Most existing climate policies work with the idea of co-benefits on the 
assumption that the primary rationale for policy implementation is to reduce 
the human impact on climate and that any co-benefits derived from such 
policy are secondary – desirable features, but not central to the policy 
imperative. Following the advice of “Capability” Brown, we argue that this 
logic needs to be inverted, so as to provide near-term, concrete, politically 
attractive benefits for near-term investments. Thus, the primary rationale for 
the policy goals articulated below is to improve the quality of human life – 
through securing public benefits in developed and developing countries and 
through managing the multi-faceted natural asset of tropical forests.  That 
each of these policy goals has co-benefits for reducing the scale of human 
forcing of the climate system should be regarded as a desirable, but not 
central, co-benefit. 
   
Eradicate emissions of black carbon20   Black carbon (or soot) is a public health 
hazard. Around 1.8 million people die every year from exposure to black 
carbon through indoor fires. Black carbon also warms the atmosphere at 
regional and global scales, contributing between 5 and 10% of the total human 
forcing of the climate system, with particular implication for Arctic ice loss.  
According to conservative estimates, one ton of black carbon causes about 
600 times the warming of one ton of carbon dioxide over a period of 100 
years. It is feasible nearly to eradicate emissions of black carbon through 
targeted and enforced regulation.21  The environmental pay-back here is 
relatively quick, with huge public health benefits, especially for the poorest in 
developing countries. We discuss this approach further in Part III. 
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Reduce tropospheric ozone   Poor air quality in urban environments is 
exacerbated by emissions of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, methane and 
other volatile organic compounds. In the troposphere, these gases react to 
form ozone, which is toxic to humans and to plants including crops. Such 
ozone has been estimated to induce between $14-26 billion of crop damage 
annually. Tropospheric ozone contributes between 5 and 10% of the total 
human forcing of the climate system. Rigorous implementation of air 
pollution regulations, together with a move towards more efficient urban 
transportation systems, could more than halve these emissions of ozone 
precursor gases. Human health in both developed and developing nations 
would be improved and crop damage would be reduced. A co-benefit is that 
human forcing of the climate would also be reduced.22 
 
Work towards effective protection of tropical forests23   Tropical forests are a 
key asset for humanity’s future, not merely because of their carbon store, but 
also because of their husbandry of biodiversity, their timber and non-timber 
products and their wider livelihood functions for indigenous peoples. Rather 
than seeking to lock tropical forest management into an all-embracing 
climate convention, and thus get snarled up in the complexities of reducing 
industrial carbon emissions, forests should be managed in ways which 
recognise the integrated value of these ecosystems. Issues of deforestation 
should be de-coupled from the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC). 
 3) Ensuring that societies can live and cope with climate risk (‘adaptation’)  
 
It would be possible to write human history as the history of its emancipation 
from natural variability and change. Significant populations of humans now 
live in all climatic zones of the world. Technological innovations (e.g. air 
conditioning, building design, crop varieties) and cultural innovations (e.g. 
patterns of socialising, diet) that at times evolved quickly or at other times 
more slowly represent capacities adaptive to a range of climatic conditions. 
Cultural change has opened more of the world to human habitation. 
 
But what made adaptation effective in the course of human history was the 
relative stability of climatic conditions which much of the time, although not 
always, were variable within certain expected boundaries. In historical times, 
strong deviations from the experienced norms of climate, for example, bitter 
hard winters of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, taxed the capacity of 
European societies to live with extreme climatic conditions. Breughel’s 
paintings of frost fairs are examples of this. Modern climatic range conditions  
represent both a promise as well as a challenge to adaptation. Yet, adaptation 
has consistently been the poor and derided cousin of emissions reduction in 
the history of the climate regime.24 Adaptation aims at prevention of loss (and 
exploitation of opportunity). It is therefore an active response to risk, once 
recognised. 25  
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Adaptation and mitigation are not trade-offs, but complementary strategies.  
The category of the risks best managed by adaptation is certainly much larger 
than that assumed under the “Kyoto” approach, which (falsely) presented 
adaptation as a cost of failed mitigation, and thus something to be avoided. 
Since the Kyoto road effectively ended in Copenhagen, it is time to activate 
adaptation strategies with much greater vigour. Adaptation is significantly a 
development challenge. As with mitigation, it must be pursued along many 
avenues and at many scales as has been extensively argued elsewhere. In this 
paper, however, we are focusing our recommendations on energy and 
decarbonisation. That should not be interpreted as an indication of lesser 
priority, but of economy of effort; indeed, several of this paper’s authors have 
long devoted and continue to devote particular effort to advancing adaptation 
policies, which are therefore promoted in detail elsewhere.26  
 
 B: How climate change was systematically misunderstood 1985-2009, and 
 some consequences arising   
The “Kyoto” approach was constructed by quick borrowing from past practice, 
with other treaty regimes dealing with ozone, sulphur emissions and nuclear 
bombs. It was not unreasonable that hard-pressed officials at the Rio “Earth 
Summit” in 1992 looked for examples of treaties that had worked – the 
Montreal Protocol, the START Treaties, the internal US sulphur emission 
reduction regime – from which to bolt together the skeleton of the radical 
new attempt to regulate the climate that their political masters had decided 
they must do. Nor was it novel for them to do so: incremental adaption from 
past successes is what is usually done by diplomats in such circumstances.  
 
The task was fitted into what Nordhaus and Shellenberger called a ‘pollution 
paradigm’.  But, in this case, the analogies were structurally unsound.27 While 
superficially plausible, they are not applicable in the ways that the drafters 
assumed because these were all ‘tame’ problems (complicated, but with 
defined and achievable end-states), whereas climate change is ‘wicked’ 
(comprising open, complex and imperfectly understood systems). Originally 
described by Rittel and Webber in the context of urban planning, ‘wicked’ 
problems are issues that are often formulated as if they are susceptible to 
solutions when in fact they are not.28 Technical knowledge was taken as 
sufficient basis from which to derive Kyoto’s policy, whereas ‘wicked’ 
problems demand profound understanding of their integration in social 
systems, their irreducibly complexity and intractable nature. We elaborate 
this vital contrast below. 
 
The consequence of this misunderstanding was that there was a fundamental 
framing error, and climate change was represented as a conventional 
environmental ‘problem’ that is capable of being ‘solved’. It is neither of these.  
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Climate change emerged as a policy issue in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Despite a few cautionary voices29, the idea soon became 
established that climate change represented a global threat that required a 
coordinated global solution. In The Wrong Trousers, Prins and Rayner 
identified the misleading analogies with other international and 
environmental issues that shaped the FCCC and the Kyoto architecture. In 
particular, the concept of epistemic community30 circulating in policy circles 
reinforced the idea that a common diagnosis of the ‘climate problem’ was 
required to move policy forward. This view was reinforced by the prominent 
roles played, for example, by the scientific Ozone Trends Panel in the 
formation of the ozone regime and of the role of science in shaping the Med 
Plan to ‘save the Mediterranean’, neither of which were ‘wicked’ problems.   
 
Rather than being a discrete problem to be solved, climate change is better 
understood as a persistent condition that must be coped with and can only be 
partially managed more – or less – well.31 It is just one part of a larger complex 
of such conditions encompassing population, technology, wealth disparities, 
resource use, etc. Hence it is not straightforwardly an ‘environmental’ 
problem either. It is axiomatically as much an energy problem, an economic 
development problem or a land-use problem, and may be better approached 
through these avenues than as a problem of managing the behaviour of the 
Earth’s climate by changing the way that humans use energy. That is reflected 
in the radical reframing which we employ for this paper. 
 
What makes a problem ‘wicked’ is the impossibility of giving it a definitive 
formulation: the information needed to understand the problem is dependent 
upon one’s idea for solving it. Furthermore, wicked problems lack a stopping 
rule: we cannot know whether we have a sufficient understanding to stop 
searching for more understanding. There is no end to causal chains in 
interacting open systems of which the climate is the world’s prime example. 
So, every wicked problem can be considered as a symptom of another 
problem.32 
 
That is frustrating for politicians. So policy makers frequently respond to 
wicked problems by declaring ‘war’ on them, to beat them into submission 
and then move on. Indeed, almost any ‘declaration of war’ that is 
metaphorical rather than literal is a reliable sign that the subject in question 
is ‘wicked’. So, we have the war on cancer, the war on poverty, the war on 
drugs, the war on terror and now the war on climate change.  
 
The public is often initially stirred by such declarations of war; but, as wicked 
problems demonstrate their intractability, the public soon grows weary of 
them. Recent polls suggest that public opinion in many developed nations is 
losing its previously intense preoccupation with climate issues as it becomes 
increasingly apparent that it is no more a problem to be ‘solved’ than is 
poverty, and as attention focuses on what people feel to be more pressing 
issues, like the economy.33 
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 C: Misunderstanding the nature of the science of Earth systems 
A second misunderstanding has developed in parallel with that of the 
misapplied analogies from other treaty situations. In its way, it is as profound 
and as widely shared a ‘mis-framing’ and it concerns the popular view of 
science as projected by users of scientific information and by those producers 
of primary science on climate issues who have chosen also to act as advocates 
and activists. They employ a ‘deficit model’ of science. The expert scientist 
pours knowledge into the ignorant and passive heads of the public and their 
representatives. Their deficit is remedied. They trust the expert’s superior 
knowledge and qualifications and the scientist then leverages that power to 
instruct further the ignorant public and to delineate the correct actions to 
remedy the situation which the expert has described.  
 
Hulme documents the special role of this sort that was played by the Met 
Office’s “Dangerous Climate Change” conference of 2005, held at the behest 
of Prime Minister Blair’s office ahead of the Gleneagles G-8 summit, and the 
associated role of the then Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government.34  The 
same model was endlessly repeated in the pre 17th November 2009 assertions 
of the unimpeachability of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
usually citing percentages of agreement or numbers of scientists agreeing.  
Journalists placed implicit and in retrospect excessive trust in such deficit-
model statements. Their sense of betrayal, to be detected among many 
observers of the climate debate after the 17th November watershed, perhaps 
explains the ferocity with which the climate science community is being 
investigated by the media now.   
 
In fact, there is another sort of insight about the popular model of science 
that is important. This is the way in which the role of value judgements can 
be unhelpfully obscured. In his 2007 book on science policy, Roger Pielke Jr 
presents the issue in the following way. He notes that the prediction of an 
imminent tornado is judged to be a sufficient basis for action without 
reference to other criteria. It is solely an issue of trust in the authoritativeness 
of the source. This trust results not because values are not present, but rather 
simply because the value issues are not in dispute: no one wants to die 
because of being in the path of a tornado that everyone agrees is heading in 
their direction. In contrast, a person’s position on the question of abortion 
may be informed by medical expert knowledge, but it is well understood that 
religious and other views may play a greater a role in how people think about 
the issue. The consequence of the misunderstanding of science by the ‘deficit’ 
model, Pielke suggests, is that climate change policy, which with its multiple 
framings is more similar to peoples’ views on abortion, has been commonly 
presented as if it were akin to the value-consensus context of the tornado 
prediction. In turn, this error has led to the common and flawed assumption 
that the solutions to climate change should be ‘science driven’ as if a shared 
understanding of science will lead to a political consensus.35  Rather, as we have 
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seen, the diverse political framings reveal themselves in alternative views of 
science. The consequence is that debates about climate politics are then 
waged in the guise of debates about science, to the detriment of both. 
 
Yet, as we have striven to make clear, ‘climate change’ is not a single problem 
amenable to a single understanding or a single solution path. Climate change 
was brought to the attention of policy-makers by scientists. From the outset, 
these scientists also brought their preferred solutions to the table in US 
Congressional hearings and other policy forums, all bundled. The proposition 
that ‘science’ somehow dictated particular policy responses, encouraged – 
indeed instructed – those who found those particular strategies unattractive 
to argue about the science.36 So, a distinctive characteristic of the climate 
change debate has been of scientists claiming with the authority of their 
position that their results dictated particular policies; of policy makers 
claiming that their preferred choices were dictated by science, and both 
acting as if ‘science’ and ‘policy’ were simply and rigidly linked as if it were a 
matter of escaping from the path of an oncoming tornado.  
 
Elected decision-makers would like to know how climate change will affect 
specific political jurisdictions, and, more importantly, what types of 
interventions will make a difference, over what time scales, at what costs, and 
to whose benefit– and whose detriment. But, when it comes to questions like 
these, political beliefs act like magnets, selecting, and interpreting the science 
as it is aligned by their force fields. In the case of climate modelling, which 
has been prominent in the public debate, the many and varied ‘projective’ 
scenarios (that is, explorations of plausible futures using computer models 
conditioned on a large number of assumptions and simplifications) are 
sufficient to undergird just about any view of the future that one prefers.37  
But the ‘projective’ models they produce have frequently been conflated 
implicitly and sometimes wilfully with what politicians really want, namely 
‘predictive’ scenarios: that is, precise forecasts of the future.  
Politics is not about maximising rationality. It is about finding compromises that 
enough people can tolerate to allow society to take steps in the right direction. So, 
contrary to all our modern instincts, political progress on climate change simply 
cannot be solved by injecting more scientific information into politics. More 
information does not automatically reduce uncertainty and increase public 
confidence, which is the common politicians’ assumption. But, in consequence of 
that assumption being present and potent in this (or any) politically hot field, 
there is a constant temptation for experts to overstate and to oversimplify: 
something that is plainly revealed in the recent history of climate issues.38 But this 
is a recipe for political disappointment, as the 2010 Gallup poll cited at fn 33 
documented. It shows a trend setting in of increasing erosion of public trust in the 
assertions of climate scientists, although, interestingly, to date this has not 
translated into an equivalent disenchantment with taking practical action.39  
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More fundamentally than in the realm of politics, over-stating confidence about 
what is known is much more likely to lead us astray in basic research than 
admitting ignorance. It locks us into rigid agenda and framings such as the one 
that gave us the dead end of Kyoto, rather than leaving open multiple, even 
competing options, that allow for learning and adaptability in moving 
understanding forward. This dynamic tension has always been the motor force in 
scientific revolutions.40   
Within hotly contested debates and in the study of wicked and complex open-
system issues, in fact the most useful knowledge is of that different sort. It 
pertains to what we know that we do not know, or to where there remains much 
doubt or disagreement. Then we can consider why we don’t know or have doubts. 
That knowledge will help us to grade our certainty, to sensitise us to the 
significance of the unexpected and to make connections that others do not see: for 
example, Professor Dame Jocelyn Bell Burnell as a graduate student at Cambridge 
in December 1967 spotting the radio signals which led to discovery of pulsars, or 
James Lovelock looking for signs of life on Mars which led him to the Gaia 
hypothesis of a self-regulating, life-supporting atmosphere on Earth. In that way 
we can make credible progress.41  
But we should never overlook the inherent unknowability of the future 
behaviour of climate-change drivers ranging from population growth to 
economic performance to technological innovation. They introduce 
irresolvable uncertainty independent of how well the basic science of climate 
is understood. In sum, in our understanding, we invert the conventional 
wisdom on the relationship between scientific knowledge and politics which 
has informed the FCCC/Kyoto approach. Awareness of the indeterminate and 
the unknown has profound political as well as research methodological value 
because it releases the power of systematic doubt. Value disputes that are 
hidden behind positivist scientific claims and counterclaims may thus be 
brought more clearly into the sunlight of democratic deliberation. Until that 
happens, the political system will remain in gridlock, and everyone will be 
convinced that they have certainty and truth on their side  
 
 Part III:  A Radical Departure from Business-As-Usual 
 in Climate Policy 
 
The crossing of two thresholds in late 2009 was documented in Part I.  
Crossing those thresholds made unavoidable the difficulties which had 
already arisen from longer established errors in the understanding and 
application of diplomatic process and of scientific knowledge about ‘wicked’ 
problems. These were explained in Part II.  So far, this paper has sought to 
provide as clear an account as we collectively can give of where the world 
stands in 2010 in face of a nexus of issues comprising climate change; 
humanity’s knowledge of Earth’s biophysical systems (and especially our 
swiftly increasing knowledge of our ignorance of their mysteries); and 
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extensive governmental and intergovernmental political and econ0mic 
interventions in this field since 1992 (and especially since 2005/6). Finally, this 
nexus threatens continuing erosion of public trust in expert institutions 
whose integrity is necessary if we are to manage more rather than less 
effectively.  
 
We believe that we should begin with the actions that can command the 
broadest assent and achieve the quickest results. Once there are some 
palpable achievements to show, we believe that a constituency of public trust 
may be rebuilt and that a constituency of public permission may grow. These 
are the indispensible prerequisites for harder tasks. Our goal is broad-based 
support for radical acceleration in decarbonisation of the global energy 
economy. We believe that an indirect approach, which pulls on the twin 
levers of reducing the energy intensity of economies and the carbon intensity 
of energy, is more likely to win public assent than a frontal assault upon 
carbon emissions, especially one coming soon after the recent turbulences.   
This is because there are many potential constituencies for, and beneficiaries 
of such efforts, independent of the politics of climate change 
 
For the avoidance of misunderstanding, two points must be spelt out. First, 
we do not mean that all or any action on the most ambitious goal of radical 
decarbonisation is postponed until previous steps – such as efficiency 
improvements – are successfully underway, let alone complete. As we make 
clear below, we think that the research, development, demonstration and 
deployment (RDD&D) phase of radical decarbonisation, funded by a low 
carbon tax, could and should start at once. But the sequencing of steps is 
consciously informed by the lessons of recent failures, which we seek by all 
means to avoid. 
 
Secondly, to advocate this different pathway does not imply that we think that 
there is inadequate or weak scientific evidence to support the case for 
decarbonisation. However, as we have been at pains to explain, we do not view the 
scientific evidence in the way that it has been mainly presented to the public by 
issue advocates. As The Economist wrote in its special survey of climate science on 
20th March 2010, “Action on climate is justified, not because the science is certain, 
but precisely because it is not.”42  Its view is close to ours. Our position is that 
action is justified on a whole range of issues often subsumed by the climate 
change framing. Many of these issues can stand on their own irrespective of the 
state of climate science. In the process of tackling them, we can diffuse obliquely 
some of the climate forcings – while creating the experience of positive feedbacks 
from action. So, it is not just that science does not dictate climate policy; it is that 
climate policy alone does not dictate environmental or development or energy 
policies.   
 
Since views of ‘what the science says’  have become matters that can be easily 
misrepresented, sometimes intentionally in the hyper-politicised climate 
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debate, for the avoidance of misunderstanding, our view of the present status 
of climate science, in minimalist terms, is as follows. 
 
The sharp increase in concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere from the pre-
industrial level of around 280 ppm to 389 ppm today, and rising in recent 
times at just under 2 ppm per year, is one of the firmest data tracks which we 
possess. It is also the least controversial graph in the current debate; and the 
rise which it documents is unprecedented in the last 10,000 years.43 But how 
this clear CO2 trend relates to global temperature and distributed weather 
extremes is much cloudier.44 How rising CO2 levels – and other human 
forcings  – may relate to  prospective climate change is, by extension, a 
further articulation of theory, data and modeling of the most mysterious of 
complex systems on Earth. These efforts too have become controversial.45 But 
what is certain is that such projections are uncertain.  
 
We have already deplored the side-lining of non-CO2 forcing agents from the 
previous climate policy regime for non-scientific reasons, and will shortly 
return some of them to the front line of future action.  But in our view, the 
Mauna Loa CO2 trend line alone justifies action to abate its rate of rise, even if 
– and, in fact, particularly because – we do not know for certain what its 
causal effects are or may be. We share the common view that it would be 
prudent to accelerate the historical trend of reducing the carbon intensity of 
our economies, which has been a by-product of innovation since the late 
eighteenth century46. However, we do not recommend doing so by processes 
that injure economic growth, which we think – and the history of climate 
policy demonstrates – is politically impossible with informed democratic 
consent.  
 
 A: Returning the relegated non-CO2 ‘forcers’ to front line service 
 
We observed earlier that the human influences on the global climate system 
are not limited to the input of CO2, but involve a range of other climate 
forcing agents that operate in broader environmental contexts.  But, for 
reasons of convenience in framing policy, not for scientific reasons, they have 
been over-looked. Since action on these non CO2 ‘forcers’ may have quicker 
impact and large, immediate primary benefits, we would give them priority, 
now. In contrast to long and arduous tasks, these can be ‘quick hits’.  They 
achieve widely subscribed practical effects and they can thereby help to re-
build public confidence. 
 
The majority of these other forcings, specifically black carbon (soot) and 
other aerosols, reactive nitrogen, tropospheric ozone and methane, are prime 
ingredients of air pollution. The somatic health benefits of reducing air 
pollution are well-known and welcomed. National clean air legislation to 
enforce it has been well demonstrated in many jurisdictions, particularly 
since the iconic British Clean Air Act 1956 (passed in response to the Great 
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London Smog of 1952)47. Among their climatic effects these other forcing 
agents have a role in altering atmospheric and ocean circulation features away 
from what they would be in the natural climate system. They have additional 
climate effects though solar heating of the boundary layer that leads to the 
evaporation of clouds and changes in snow and ice albedo: black soot falling 
on white snow and ice increases the absorption of heat and may hasten 
melting. 48 In fact, as ‘How to get climate policy back on course’ already 
suggested, reporting new work, black soot may help to explain the recent 
Arctic ice melt more convincingly than anything else. Black carbon may have 
contributed up to 50% to the recently observed warming in the Arctic.49   
 
Most fine aerosol particles, including sulfate, nitrate, and carbon, scatter solar 
radiation back to space and lead to cooling. However, black carbon that 
emanates from diesel engines, inefficient cooking stoves, forest fires and the 
like, absorbs solar radiation and warms the atmosphere. Because of these 
feedback processes and its characteristics in the atmosphere, black carbon is 
considered in many studies to be the second most important anthropogenic 
component of global warming after carbon dioxide.50 Black carbon has 
received attention only recently and its effects have not yet been taken 
properly into account in the IPCC reports.51  
 
Shine and Sturges estimated that 40% of the heat trapped by anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the Earth’s atmosphere is due to gases other than 
CO2.
 52  In a recent study, Bera et al. analysed more than a dozen molecules 
involved in global warming to find out which chemical and physical 
properties are most important in determining their inherent radiative 
efficiency, and thus possess the largest potential to contribute to global 
warming.53 They found that molecules containing several fluorine atoms tend 
to be strong GHGs, compared to molecules containing chlorine and/or 
hydrogen. For instance, some hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), which are continually utilised in various industries, 
were shown to be extremely efficient greenhouse gases as they absorb in the 
atmospheric infrared window and in some cases have atmospheric lifetimes 
estimated at thousands of years. The study concluded that some PFCs and 
HFCs display the characteristics to impact global temperatures significantly 
more than CO2 in terms both of short-term and long-term effects. This being 
so, they can be immediately acted on under the successful Montreal 
Protocol.54  Some of the most effective HFCs have global warming potentials 
that are thousands of times that of CO2. For example, over a 100 year period, 
nitrogen trifluoride has a global warming potential 17,200 times that of CO2. 
 
The importance of land use change to emissions of GHGs is well established, 
with approximately one-third of anthropogenic CO2 emissions since 1850 
attributed to land use activities.55 However, a growing body of evidence 
suggests that land use is playing a significant role in ongoing climate change 
through a set of biogeochemical mechanisms independent of the radiative 
effects of GHG emissions, the influences being most pronounced at the scale 
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of urbanised regions.56 For example, the recent work by Stone suggests that 
alterations in surface fluxes of moisture and energy resulting from land use 
activities may contribute to regional scale climate phenomena more directly 
than associated changes in emissions. Most, if not all, of these human 
influences on regional and global climate will continue to be of concern 
during the coming decades. Moreover, rapidly expanding urban populations 
are increasingly vulnerable to rates of warming exceeding that of the planet as 
a whole. 
 
In light of this evidence, a more comprehensive and, ultimately, effective 
climate change mitigation effort must respond both to the atmospheric and 
land surface drivers of warming. Firstly, we need separate policy frameworks 
and interventions for short-lived and long-lived climate forcing agents. The 
physical properties, sources and policy levers of short-lived forcing agents – 
black soot, aerosols, methane and tropospheric ozone – are quite different 
from those for long-lived forcing agents – carbon dioxide, halocarbons, 
nitrous oxide. More attention should be paid to designing better materials 
that have minimal absorption capabilities in the atmospheric window, or 
shorter atmospheric lifetimes.  
 
Secondly, mitigating some degree of the human influence on climate could be 
achieved through land use policies. At the scale of regions, this could mean 
avoiding deforestation to hold the potential to restore moisture and energy 
balances, whereas in urban environments enhanced tree protection, for 
example, should be recognised as a form of climate change mitigation.  
 
Finally, current mitigation strategies assume reductions in the atmospheric 
concentration of GHGs (typically expressed in units of carbon dioxide 
equivalents as part of the standardisation on this metric) and enhancements 
of sinks to be the sole mechanisms through which ongoing changes in climate 
can be slowed or arrested.57 However, broadening the range of management 
strategies beyond those conventionally defined as ‘mitigation’ would have 
other benefits, for human health, agricultural productivity, and 
environmental quality, which, together with their climate change relevance, 
justify the actions needed to achieve the alternative scenario.58  
 
 B: Ensuring that the best is not the enemy of the good in a complex world 
 
For decades and longer, energy experts have debated the potential for 
efficiency gains to reduce overall energy use, and more recently its potential 
role in decarbonising economic activity. Since at least 1980, reductions in the 
energy intensity of gross domestic product (GDP) have been the primary 
factor responsible for the decarbonisation of the global economy. However, 
both energy use and carbon emissions have continued to rise despite the 
consistent and longstanding decline in the energy intensity of the global 
economy. As such, we believe that continued and even accelerated rates of 
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global energy intensity decline will not be sufficient to accelerate 
decarbonisation in the future. The most significant reason for this view is the 
assumption of greatly increasing energy demand in coming decades which is 
to be found stated across virtually all energy scenarios of international energy 
agencies and major energy companies. Many such scenarios do not envisage a 
dramatic expansion of energy access to the 1.5 billion people presently lacking 
reliable access, as we do here.  So, our ambition lies on top of the already 
formidable conventional assumptions. Future rates of energy intensity decline 
will affect how much new energy is ultimately needed, but it will not alter the 
fact that much more energy is needed.  In a context of increasing energy 
demand, the simple mathematics of carbon dioxide emissions indicate that 
decarbonisation of energy supply should take the lead as the primary factor 
responsible for future decarbonisation of economic activity. 
 
Therefore, in this part of the paper, we offer no resolution to the long-
standing and on-going debates about the relative role of efficiency in future 
energy demand. Nor do we feel that our case requires us to do so. In many, if 
not most, instances, efforts to improve efficiency can be justified for reasons 
other than decarbonisation. Moreover, modernising and improving the 
efficiency of energy systems creates the conditions for their diversification 
and decarbonisation. In this way, efficiency policies can prepare the way for 
other decarbonisation policies.   
 
 1) The political prerequisite of energy efficiency strategies 
 
While the acceleration of decarbonisation of energy supply is the only long- 
term approach that can deliver a radical acceleration of decarbonisation of 
economic activity, it will not be quickly or easily deployed and the primary 
RDD&D will have to be funded from the public purse. That means that tax-
payers must be persuaded that it is in their interests for this to happen. The 
political goal therefore has a technological edge. The goal must be to make 
clean energy cheaper at point of use to the consumer than dirty energy and – 
a vital point – the price differential must be capable of being maintained 
without permanent subsidies.  
 
At a time when public opinion polls show that the resumption of economic 
growth and the creation of jobs rank far higher than action on human-
induced climate change for most voters in OECD countries, it makes eminent 
sense to promote policies which can to some degree engage both. The fact 
that energy efficiency saves money, makes industry more productive and 
attains other worthwhile objectives, and is therefore a much more 
immediately attractive prospect politically, makes it worth doing irrespective 
of the benefits to carbon policy. That means recognising the importance of 
reducing energy intensity which in turn is most elegantly achieved by the 
systematic application of a sectoral approach that concentrates efforts on the 
most energy intensive sectors first, pre-eminently power production, 
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aluminium, cement and steel production. These are also sectors that are 
prime movers in modern economies. 
 
The case study documents one of the world’s most indispensible and energy 
intensive industries. The global steel industry illustrates the potential for and 
limits to emissions reductions achieved by disseminating best technological 
practices across an industry sector. An effective international sectoral regime 
can help control substitution of production by lower standard producers (as 
the case study documents in the Asia Pacific Partnership [APP] context). Such 
improvements are worth doing for a host of economic reasons. However, as 
the case shows, they cannot alter the long-term need for the decarbonisation 
of global energy supply if targets for CO2 emissions reductions are ultimately 
to be met.   
 
 The Potential for and Limits to a Sectoral Approach Focused on Efficiency: 
 A Case Study of the Steel Industry’s Global Sectoral Approach 
Global steel demand has been rapidly growing. In the past ten years, strong 
economic growth in developing countries, particularly in the BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) countries, pushed up steel demand by 60%. Considering 
the fact that the per capita steel consumption in China and India, compared 
with developed countries, is still one third and one tenth, respectively, this 
demand growth will continue for coming decades59. Meeting this growing 
steel demand with minimum CO2 emissions is an important issue for the steel 
industry. But CO2 emission is unavoidable in crude steel production, which 
uses carbon (coke) as a reducing agent to make iron ore into pig iron. 
However, crude steel production is also a heavily energy intensive process. 
Therefore, efficiency improvements, including energy recovery and re-cycled 
use in the process, not only save energy consumption but also reduce CO2 
emissions per ton of steel produced. Energy savings and CO2 savings are 
almost synonymous for steel. The Japanese steel industry experience may be 
unusual in the way in which it has increased production and reduced energy 
and emissions; but it can serve as an example of what can be achieved in 
practice and it has helped inform a global approach across the steel sector. 
 
Since the oil price shocks in the 1970s, various energy saving technologies 
have been developed and invested in by the Japanese steel industry. In 
consequence, about 30% energy efficiency improvement has been achieved in 
the past 30 years .60 As a result, the Japanese steel industry is equipped almost 
100% with currently available major energy saving technologies. The APP61 
Steel Task Force has listed such energy saving technologies and surveyed the 
diffusion ratio of those technologies to member countries. The conclusion 
was that if those existing energy saving technologies were to penetrate 100% 
into the steel industries within the original six member countries of APP 
(Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States), as much as 127 
million ton-CO2 could be saved every year
62. The APP Steel Task Force has 
listed such technologies and published them as the SOACT Handbook, which 
is publicly accessible on the APP website.63 
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Similar CO2 saving potential was estimated by the IEA, and 340 million ton-
CO2 per year can be saved in the steel industry by the global base diffusion of 
currently available energy saving technologies.64 The amount is almost 25% of  
the entire Japanese CO2 emissions in 2008.  
 
The mission for the steel industry is to meet the global demand growth with 
minimum energy consumption (= minimum CO2 emission). This can only be 
achieved by penetration of the current best available energy saving 
technologies.  
 
Since most of the energy saving technologies are ‘negative cost’ processes, if 
not very profitable, their diffusion in the steel industries not only saves CO2 
emissions but also brings some economic benefit to steel industries in 
recipient countries. However, the technologies described above are not 
necessarily widely spread in the industry. The APP Steel Task Force has 
analysed and identified diffusion barriers.  Among them are longer 
investment recovery periods and the lack of engineering capabilities in steel 
industries in developing nations. One important factor is that the Internal 
Ratio of Return (IRR) for production expansion tends to be much larger than 
that for energy saving investments in most of the fast growing developing 
countries. Therefore, scarce resources such as capital and engineering 
capacity are not necessarily allocated to energy saving investments. 
 
Since most of the energy saving technologies in the steel industry have been 
commercialised and made widely available in the global engineering market, 
technology accessibility is not a barrier and some kind of public incentive 
mechanism, which places priority on energy saving investment, is necessary 
and could be expected to reduce the investment barrier.  
 
Since steel is so CO2 intensive, the CO2 emission per value added in steel is far 
larger than other industries or economic activities. Therefore, CO2 reductions 
achieved by energy saving investments in the steel process should be much 
larger than the additional CO2 emissions resulting from extra profits 
generated by energy savings.  
 
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the global base diffusion of 
best available energy saving technologies in steel is an effective measure only 
in the short and mid-term (10-20 years). Once 100% penetration ratio has 
been achieved, there will be no more opportunity for energy savings/CO2 
emission savings from those existing technologies. So, the energy efficiency 
route is a pathway to and complementary to more fundamental 
decarbonisation. 
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 2) The primacy of accelerated decarbonisation of energy supply 
 
There have been nearly twenty years of efforts to influence emissions directly 
by – paradoxically – indirect methods. Principally, these methods are ‘top 
down’ regulation of the end uses of energy. They have been highly ambitious, 
including the attempted and flawed manufacture of a market for carbon; but 
they have failed to reduce emissions or, more importantly, accelerate the rate 
of decarbonisation of economies. In their Byzantine complexity, they have 
also just crashed politically at Copenhagen. Nevertheless, they have huge 
bureaucratic momentum because of vast sunk political capital, notably in 
Europe.  So, as they roll on, they are also irritating more increasingly sceptical 
citizens in democracies, as the costs to families and to individuals from this 
“Kyoto” type of strategy are gradually but inevitably revealed. We have yet to 
see how electorates react to large and rising increases in electricity bills when 
the public understand that they are discretionary, for so-called ‘green’ 
reasons, and not because of market conditions. 
 
Aware of this, we therefore propose as an act of policy to accelerate a well 
understood and successful trend aiming to achieve real reductions in 
emissions indirectly by – not so paradoxically – direct methods. This strategy 
is aimed with intensity and focus on the supply side at the primary 
production of energy. We are optimistic about its technical promise. We are 
also much more confident about its political realism.  Unlike the previous 
“Kyoto” strategy, this one goes ‘with the grain’ of the three overarching goals 
that we set earlier. The other leading benefits that will arise are all eagerly 
sought and are widely endorsed. This strategy is also harmonious with 
economic growth, which is a prerequisite for any sort of political traction in 
major economies. The trajectory of the Obama administration’s attempts to 
engage the climate issue is an illustration of this basic truth.   
 
In ‘How to get climate policy back on course’, where it was explained thus, 
this strategy was called the “Kaya Direct” approach in recognition of the 
insight of Professor Yoichi Kaya: 
 
The Kaya Identity shows that there are four – and four only – macro-
scale policy levers in pursuit of emissions reductions. These are, 
respectively, population, wealth, energy intensity (meaning units 
of energy per unit of GDP) and carbon intensity (meaning the 
amount of carbon produced per unit of energy). Each of these factors 
is amenable to the action of a particular lever and each lever 
prescribes a particular approach to policy. 
 
In the case of population, the lever is population management. In the 
case of wealth, the lever is to reduce the size of the economy. In the 
case of energy intensity, the lever is to increase energy efficiency. 
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And for carbon intensity, a switch to energy sources that generate 
fewer emissions is the primary lever.  
 
The relationship between the four factors in the Kaya Identity can be 
expressed mathematically as follows:  
 
carbon emissions = C = P x GDP x  TE      x   C 
                P        GDP        TE 
(where TE is total energy) 
 
Our strategy is to find ways to pull the levers of energy and carbon intensity. 
 
Even without the goal of expanding access to energy to all people, the IEA 
projects that global energy use will roughly triple between today and 2050. (It 
is useful to recollect by way of comparison that energy use increased 
sixteenfold during the twentieth century.) Under such conditions, achieving 
the large emissions reductions suggested in climate policy discussions can 
realistically only be achieved through radical improvements in the cost and 
performance of zero or very low carbon energy supply. Reducing global 
carbon emissions associated with energy use by 50% from current levels, 
while tripling energy consumption, entails an 87% reduction in the carbon 
intensity of the global energy supply. As we shall see, that is an endeavour 
which, for all practical purposes, requires the same breakthroughs in the cost 
and performance of zero carbon energy technology as the complete 
decarbonisation of the global energy supply.  
 
Were global energy use to grow more slowly, the percentage of global energy 
supply that would need to be decarbonised would be marginally less. But this 
would not alter the fundamental nature of the challenge of decarbonisation. 
For instance, in the unlikely event that global energy demand only grew by a 
factor of two and not three, implying a significant gain in efficiency, global 
energy supply would need to decarbonise by 75% rather than 87%. So, as in 
the higher energy demand scenario, such a decline in the carbon intensity of 
energy requires practically the same energy technology revolution as 
complete decarbonisation.    
 
But limiting the growth of global energy demand to a factor of two rather 
than three appears highly unlikely, particularly given that the IEA baseline 
estimates for global energy demand growth already make very robust, indeed 
unprecedented, decarbonisation assumptions, largely driven by very high 
assumed annual rates of global energy intensity decline. In any case, if 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are to be stabilised at a 
low level, then a near complete decarbonisation of energy supply will be 
needed, and this conclusion is not particularly sensitive to individual 
assumptions in energy scenarios. 
 
 22th April 2010 
THE HARTWELL PAPER: FINAL TEXT 
EMBARGOED UNTIL 11 MAY 2010 0600 BST 
 29 
Thus, long-term public policy effort to reduce global carbon emissions must 
focus inevitably on decarbonising the global energy supply.65 The principal 
obstacle to doing this is the high cost of low or non-carbon sources of energy. 
Fossil fuels are still abundant and have many desirable characteristics. They 
are energy-dense, transportable, widely available, easy to access, and contain 
their own storage mechanism. Low-carbon alternatives are almost universally 
more expensive than fossil fuels. When in competition with other sources (i.e. 
except in very remote or very poor settings) renewables (wind, solar thermal, 
solar PV, geothermal, wave, etc.) are more expensive except under the best of 
circumstances, i.e. when located at optimal sites; close to existing 
transmission lines; displacing peak generation rather than base load, and 
serving a constituency willing to pay higher prices.  
 
In several OECD countries, renewables are growing quickly from a low base 
thanks to generous government subsidies. But these subsidies will become 
increasingly difficult to maintain politically as renewables increase their 
market share. For example, if electricity from wind in the USA, which is 
currently at 2 percent, reached 20 percent, the US subsidy would rise to $20 
billion annually (discounting the significant technical challenges that would 
accompany such an increase of scale).66 Already we have seen some backlash 
to subsidies for solar photovoltaics (PVs) in California and Germany. In 
Britain, a leading deep green environmental activist is currently leading a 
newspaper campaign against the very generous PV ‘feed-in’ tariff that has just 
been introduced, on the grounds that it takes money via increased electricity 
bills from poor people without large south-facing roofs and deep pockets and 
gives it to those who have both.67 The chilling history of European and 
particularly British wind-power, recently, is a salutary warning of what can 
happen if politicians and issue advocates ignore the realities of energy 
economics by using their control of public money to make large structural 
subsidies and of legal and political processes to grant exceptional zoning 
permissions. It has led to poorly-chosen wind facilities that have performed 
much less well than promised, with serious financial and social consequences 
because they also distort overall portfolio investment decisions in significant 
ways.68 
 
A current obstacle to the expansion of renewables is the difficulty in 
establishing transmission lines from windy and sunny places to cities and 
industrial centres, where the power is needed. Perhaps an even greater 
obstacle is the development of utility-scale storage for intermittent renewable 
energies such as wind and solar, a development that waits major 
technological breakthroughs. President Obama’s stimulus plan contained 
only modest investments in new transmission, leading some experts to 
wonder whether renewables can be brought to scale.69 The final total budget 
for new lines is thus a fraction of the President’s original goal. 
 
The politics of this failure stand in stark contrast to the politics that were in 
play when the interstate highways were built in the US in the 1950s. There 
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was widespread local support for them, since local communities wanted the 
development benefits associated with a major interstate passing by. There is 
no such local economic benefit to transmission lines: the power generated 
benefits the producers and their distant consumers, not the consumers or 
local governments underneath the transmission lines. Similar stories of local 
community hostility apply to government-driven attempts in Britain to 
expand on-shore wind farms. People just would not put up with it for 
aesthetic reasons, or noise pollution reasons and are decreasingly persuaded 
that their sacrifice of landscape or of silence would be for any useful purpose, 
given the evidence of an inherently low ratio of actual availability to installed 
capacity of wind-power, which is only rentable under regimes either of 
permanently very much higher energy costs or of permanent taxpayers’ 
subsidy, as earlier mentioned.  
 
Nuclear power may be experiencing a revival. In the US, President Obama 
announced new loans for the industry, and nuclear is viewed as a key low-
carbon power source in Britain, Japan and China. However, new plants 
continue to be far more expensive to build than coal and other fossil fuel 
plants, due to the safety, waste, and proliferation concerns, both real and 
imagined. 70  
 
So things are tough for the low carbon primary energy technologies already in 
view. 
 
Hence, we assume that for as long as the technology and price gap between 
fossil fuels and low-carbon energy remains so wide, those parts of the world 
experiencing rapid economic growth will deepen their reliance on fossil fuels. 
China is currently increasing its deployment of renewables and nuclear 
plants, but it is understandably doing so for more than CO2 abatement 
reasons, including increasing its energy security, reducing its air pollution, 
and expanding its market leader status. But China is not deploying 
renewables at a rate fast enough to slow substantially its expansion of coal 
power generation, much less to replace coal generation. Like India, China has 
made it perfectly clear that it will accept no externally imposed constraints on 
its rate of economic growth, and most of this growth continues to be driven 
by expansion of use of fossil fuels. The situation is the same in much of the 
developing world. 
 
Therefore, the bottom line is that there will be little progress in accelerating 
the decarbonisation of the global economy until low carbon energy supply 
becomes reliably cheaper and provides reliability of supply. This will require 
significant, step-change improvement to currently available low carbon 
technologies. In short, we need to ignite effort to achieve an energy 
technology revolution71 in all the currently active areas:  for solar panels to 
convert sunlight into electricity much more efficiently; for biofuels to be 
grown cheaply without intensive fossil fuel inputs and without an 
opportunity/cost for food production, and for batteries to be less energy 
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intensive to manufacture and to store much more energy in smaller amounts 
of space. Given the low energy density of any individual wind turbine, which 
is just a fact of physics, there is little to be done there except to compensate 
by deploying great numbers in empty or wild places where the wind blows in 
the right speed ranges, constantly (in Mongolia or the Sierra Nevada, for 
example) and where the transmission problem mentioned above is not 
present. Such places are not that common. For nuclear plants to become 
much cheaper they will probably need to be smaller, mass manufactured, 
proliferation-proof and need to store, recycle or otherwise find a satisfactory 
solution to their own waste. 
 
Thus, improving the efficiency of solar panels, improving the energy density 
of electric batteries and fuel cells, development of Third Generation 
(cellulosic) bio-fuels, and solving the design and materials challenges 
associated with mass manufacture of small, self contained nuclear plants are 
clear technical challenges upon which clean energy research, development, 
and deployment efforts must focus. These improvements must achieve cost 
and performance improvements that will not come about in the absence of 
determined participation of governments. 
 
Such efforts must be led by the public sector for several reasons. First, private 
funding of R&D is unusually low in the energy sector, worldwide, because 
there are few incentives to innovate. In the US, pharmaceutical firms invest 
20 percent, information technology 15 percent, and semiconductors 16 
percent, whereas energy firms invest 0.23%.72 The reasons for the low 
investment in energy are obvious:  energy is cheap, and an electron or (British 
Thermal Unit) BTU obtained from one source is as good as one obtained from 
another. In contrast, US public sector health R&D investment is today at $30 
billion per year, and private sector investment is at nearly twice that level, 
because an aging population demands new treatments for many incurable, 
acute and chronic conditions.73  
 
Secondly, the high capital costs associated with energy technologies – as 
compared to say, software development – create enormous obstacles to 
private sector investment in new, costly, and unproven energy technologies.  
 
Barriers to private sector development of new energy technologies – high 
capital costs, low end-use product differentiation, limited first mover 
advantage, low cost of existing energy sources, widely deployed and 
optimised incumbent technologies – are likely too high to be overcome. 
Indeed, virtually every existing low carbon technology was developed by the 
public sector, not the private sector. 74  
 
France and Sweden have decarbonised more than any other nation through 
public deployment of nuclear power and hydro, respectively. By contrast, 
Europe’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and other price and market based 
policies have failed to drive substantial development or deployment of clean 
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energy technologies, despite creating a much-touted but very volatile ‘price 
on carbon’. (It has crashed already three times in the short history of the 
ETS.)75   
 
The cases of France and Sweden teach two other important lessons. The 
general lesson is that governments must not only push innovation through 
R&D, standards setting or demonstration;  they must also pull new energy 
technologies into the market through their role as large, early-adopting 
purchasing customers.  Indeed, the role of government as a customer for 
emerging technologies has been a key catalyst – arguably the key catalyst – for 
technological innovation across most of the important areas of new 
technology since World War II, from aircraft and jet engines to 
telecommunication systems and information technologies.76 This argument 
applies even more so to energy technologies, for the reasons we have 
enumerated. The particular lesson is classic “Capability” Brown. In each case, 
there was another strong motivation to act from which the power programme 
flowed as a contingent benefit. In the French case, famously, the prime mover 
was a Gaullist feeling after the Suez debacle of 1956 that never again should 
France’s security of energy supply be allowed to be hostage to the English-
speaking powers.  
 
There are almost certainly hard political and economic constraints on the 
expansion of heavily subsidised low emission technologies to any scale that 
will have any significant impact upon the trajectory of global carbon 
emissions, particularly in the developing world, where the bulk of those 
emissions will originate. Driving cost reductions must be the explicit purpose 
and primary design of deployment policies. Achieving consistent reductions 
in the unsubsidised cost of clean energy technologies must be the measure 
that determines which technologies will fly and which will stall in the long 
term. 
  
 C: How to pay for it: the case for a low hypothecated (dedicated) carbon tax    
Recent accumulating experience suggests that whereas it might seem 
straightforward to use taxation to modify consumer behaviour by settling a 
carbon price, energy demand is pretty inelastic and it has not proved possible 
to create carbon tax regimes that are simultaneously efficient in reducing 
demand or in stimulating innovation and that are accepted or even well 
tolerated by democratic electorates. 
 
The direct approach to establishing such a price is flawed for four reasons. 
 
First, economic theory would suggest that an efficient solution requires that 
the marginal cost of emissions be equal to the marginal damages these would 
produce.  The estimates of appropriate climate damage functions are 
extremely difficult and controversial and vary from 15$/ton C to 300$/ton C.  
Valuing the extent and timing of the damages resulting from current 
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emissions involve not only climate model uncertainty, but also subjective 
pricing of public goods (landscapes, biodiversity etc.).  Even assuming that it 
is possible to agree to an ‘efficient’ carbon price, say around 40$/ton C, the 
next obstacles become immediately apparent.77   
 
Secondly, the inability to achieve a global, political consensus for operating a 
carbon market means, as the European experience shows, that there will be 
significant incentive to leakage from carbon-restricted economies to non-
restricted ones; and there will be incentive within the carbon-restricted area 
to evade or to minimize the regulations.78  
 
Thirdly, in the most elaborate experiment of this sort to date, the case of the 
EU ETS, there has also been the problem that the desire of governments to 
claim that they are taking decarbonisation seriously is in flat conflict with a 
stronger desire not to antagonise voters. This has made the offset games 
played via the Clean Development Mechanism both useful and attractive, 
politically.79     
 
Fourthly, and perhaps most important substantively, is the lack of ‘clean’ 
technological alternatives that has just been discussed in the previous 
section. It is wrong to assume that a price on carbon can induce the 
generality of firms to undertake the requisite R&D.80 This is for a simple and 
powerful reason. Generally, basic research, development and demonstration 
cannot be easily patented. So the market has no incentive to fund it. The 
endless business battles in the pharmaceutical industry tend to revolve 
around the control and release of intellectual property and illustrate this 
point. As explained above, since much of the energy technology revolution 
will require just such basic RDD&D investment, public funding on a long-
term basis is essential; and that is why an hypothecated tax is so important.     
 
The Japanese steel industry described in the case study is a best practice 
exception, not the rule by any means. The sectoral approach to provide a 
level playing field is equally best practice and is not yet a norm. Most firms 
are simply unlikely to undertake research on the scale needed even if faced 
with a high carbon price. They would rather translocate to lower labour cost 
and less regulated places or play the emissions-permit shell game. So, this 
means that any restrictively high price or ‘cap’ on emissions would require a 
slowing of economic growth, or alternatively, the outsourcing of all ‘dirty’ 
industries, often referred to as carbon leakage. And both these, especially the 
latter, have been confirmed in practice. 
 
So, if the innovation activities will of necessity be sponsored initially by the 
public sector (even if significantly performed by private sector firms under 
government contract), let us now consider as a means to fund it an 
‘inefficient’ (in strictly theoretical terms) tax: that is to say one that is not 
equated to the marginal damages of emissions, nor aspires to be so. Here, we 
propose a low hypothecated carbon tax that is not justified on the basis of 
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trying to alter short-term consumption behaviour as the once popular “Cap & 
Trade” approach hoped to do.81 Equally, we would emphasise that the form 
and purpose of the tax proposed here is quite different from that which the 
French government proposed in September 2009, that was halted by the 
Constitutional Court in January 2010 and which President Sarkozy dropped 
on 23rd March 2010.82  The French recognised correctly that pan-European 
taxation was not likely to be adopted easily or soon and that national action 
was required. But the announced goal was to change behaviour significantly 
and to use the fact of French executive power to install a tax that could 
leverage the rest of the EU. The tax would thus become a precedent for EU 
tax harmonisation also. So, it carried multiple framings and it was strongly 
polarising: vehemently supported and vehemently opposed by different 
constituencies.   
 
In contrast, our strategy is more modest and specific. Under it, the political 
priority of governments would switch from the preoccupation with emissions 
targets under the previous “Kyoto” regime to credible long-term global 
commitments and methods to invest in energy innovation.83 A slowly rising but 
initially low carbon tax has the advantages of avoiding negative growth effects.  
We are aware that as a general rule politicians in general and Ministries of Finance 
in particular hate the principle of hypothecation, because it ties their hands. We 
see that fact as one of the virtues of hypothecation, because it removes the issue 
from the political arena in just that way, and by doing so, may help to restore 
public trust at a time when the stock of politicians is not high in many of the 
democracies. None of this is hypothetical. In the February 2010 Union Budget, the 
Indian Minister of Finance, Pranab Mukherjee, established a National Clean 
Energy Fund to support RD&D and to be funded by a tax of Rs.50/ton on both 
domestic and imported coal.84 
 
Of course, we are also aware that suitable arrangements will then need to be 
set up to manage the revenue from an hypothecated carbon tax and to direct 
investment. There are innovative models to be studied. We do not offer the 
examples as a complete blue-print. For example, we believe that experience 
shows that national rather than global agents are more likely to be effective 
in this field. China, India and the USA in particular are cool about 
multilateral enterprises. That said, the approach of the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Malaria and TB is particularly relevant because it too was faced with a 
need to promote “blue skies” research efficiently. The way that it avoided the 
dilemma of ‘winners’ was by explicitly refusing to specify preferred research 
models. Instead it invited applications from people with medical models for 
new drugs, for new ideas in treatment regimes etc. The Fund spent time and 
money on high-grade and intensive review processes through its Technical 
Review Panels, worked with applicants and then invested in the successful 
projects with successive grants, thereby funding success and discontinuing 
failure.85  Other examples are the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI), which recently announced the establishment of 
advanced market commitments to incentivise the pharmaceutical industry to 
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develop vaccines for poor countries, and the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the set of then-innovative 
regional research centres that provided the scientific and technological 
foundations of the Green Revolution. The way that the Government of India 
chooses to manage the product of its new hypothecated coal tax will be of the 
greatest interest. 
 
The conceptual model of the Global Fund is innovative and we think that it 
has much to recommend it. So we give the example to illustrate the sort of 
innovative institutional responses to new challenge that can be found and 
must be developed. The three examples given show that such challenges can 
be met.   
 
The proposed hypothecated tax would be used to conceive, develop and 
demonstrate low-carbon or carbon-free technologies. It would provide a 
dependable and secure means of financing R&D essential to decarbonisation.  
The slowly increasing nature of the tax provides a forward price signal that 
incites firms to take up the lower-carbon technologies and in turn to develop 
any particular firm-specific adjustments.86 These two characteristics of the 
slowly rising hypothecated tax allow for the most rapid path to a low-carbon 
economy.    
 
The success of an hypothecated tax will depend largely on the ability of 
policy-makers to recognise past mistakes, adopt a low tax that voters can 
accept, convincingly hypothecate the tax revenues and equally convincingly 
support and permit innovative institutions to manage that investment 
effectively. As already noted above, historical precedent suggests that 
governments will also have important ‘pull through’ roles as lead customers – 
not to be confused with ‘picking winners’ among technologies beforehand, 
and distorting markets with subsidies, which has generally not been a 
success.   
 
Underlying all is the degree to which the “Kaya Direct” model can help 
restore public trust. The restoration of public trust, as we observed at the 
beginning of this paper, is the indispensible prerequisite for any productive 
action at all on the vital, complex and hitherto badly misunderstood and 
mismanaged subject of climate policy. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to reframe the climate issue around matters 
of human dignity. Not just because that is noble or nice or necessary – 
although all of those reasons – but because it is likely to be more effective 
than the approach of framing around human sinfulness—which has just 
failed. Securing access to low-cost energy for all, including the very poor, is 
truly and literally liberating. Building resilience to surprise and to extremes 
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of weather is a practical expression of true global solidarity. Improving the 
quality of the air that people breathe is an undeniable public good.  Such a 
reorientation requires a radical rethinking and then a reordering of the 
climate policy agenda. In “Capability Brown” fashion, we have argued that 
the best ways to make practical and not merely rhetorical progress on 
decarbonisation of the global economy are by an indirect approach. To attain 
this goal we recommend an innovation-focused strategy funded by an 
hypothecated carbon tax, priced as high as is politically acceptable, which 
will certainly be rather low (bearing in mind most recently the lessons of the 
March 2010 jettisoning of its proposed carbon tax by the French 
government).  We believe that such a framing offers the greatest potential for 
securing sustainable and effective action on any – and hence on all – these 
issues. Detailed description of policy responses to our three overarching 
objectives goes well beyond what we have discussed, or indeed, what can be 
discussed in a single paper.  Nor was that its intention. We write this paper as 
a first, not as a last word on the radical reframing that we advocate. 
 
Reframing the climate issue in this manner also means giving up the idea 
that all manner of other policy goals can be attained by grinding them onto a 
sparkling, myriad-faceted gem of global carbon policy which then dazzles so 
mesmerically that it carries all before it. It does not and it did not. Instead, 
the all-inclusive “Kyoto” type of climate policy as it had become by late 2009, 
needs to be broken up into separate issues again, each addressed on its 
merits and each in its own ways. Adaptation, forests, biodiversity, air quality, 
equity and the many other disparate agendas that have been attached to the 
climate issue must again stand on their own. We believe that this will, in 
many cases, make the possibility of political action more likely than has been 
the circumstance in recent years when carbon policy was asked to pull the 
whole load of our aspirations for a better future. Of equal importance, it 
means that progress cannot be held hostage to a single policy framing. If the 
politics of improving air quality proves intractable for a time, or in a place, 
then perhaps the politics of adapting to climate impacts will have resonance. 
 
Policies about managing human influences on climate also need to be 
disentangled, with a recollected awareness of and response to their sheer 
diversity. A range of policies and methods to execute them will be needed.   
Some exist today and can be exploited for this purpose; others are still to be 
developed.   
 
Climate change presents a challenge that will never be ‘solved’ – but, as we 
observed throughout, we can do better or worse in our managing of it. We 
aspire to do better. Therefore, this paper is offered as a guide to how we 
believe that humanity might more effectively achieve this important work. 
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